Following the success of the 2021, 2022 and 2024 editions, DGA — in partnership with CREACH LABS and with the support of ANSSI, IRISA, IRMAR and the Pôle d'Excellence Cyber — is organizing the 4th edition of the Post-Quantum Cryptography workshop during the European Cyber Week 2026.
At the dawn of the quantum computing era, the security of digital communications is entering a new phase. Post-quantum cryptography is now essential to protect our data and ensure its authenticity through electronic signatures, the foundation of digital trust.
This 2-day workshop brings together the academic, industrial, and institutional communities around topics ranging from the design of schemes to their implementation and evaluation.
At the agenda:
The organising committee
From November 18, 2026 to November 19, 2026 (09:00 – 18:00)
Couvent des Jacobins, 20 Place Saint-Anne, 35000 Rennes (France) — Metro lines A & B, Station: Place Saint-Anne
Free, on prior registration — register to the conference
Chair: Guénaël Renault
Opening of the two-day track and an overview of France's institutional roadmaps, from ANSSI certification to DGA's PQC developments.
Opening
Pantxoa Amorena, Head of the Cyber Division, DGA
ANSSI PQC transition roadmap and product certification strategy
Samih Souissi and Nicolas Gurel, ANSSI
Abstract to be announced.
PQC developments at DGA
Clément Gomez, DGA
Abstract to be announced.
Coffee break
Chair: Pierre-Alain Fouque
A NIST status report on its call for additional post-quantum signature schemes, beyond the algorithms already standardised.
Status report on the additional signature schemes initiative
Pierre Ciadoux, NIST
Abstract to be announced.
Lunch
Chair: Benoît Gérard
Where the quantum threat to algorithms stands today, and how to build implementations that are genuinely trustworthy.
Quantum cryptanalysis
Martin Ekerå, Swedish NCSA
Abstract to be announced.
Technical elements on signature hybridization
Speaker to be confirmed, cryptography laboratory, ANSSI
Abstract to be announced.
Verification Mythology: Why High-Assurance Cryptography Is Just Engineering
Nadim Kobeissi, Symbolic Software
High-assurance cryptography has a mythology problem. The field presents itself as an arcane discipline where wizard-scholars produce machine-checked proofs that place code beyond reproach. The reality is more prosaic: it is software engineering with a proof step, and the proof step has the same failure modes as every other step — copy-paste errors, dead code, untested configurations, and documentation that drifts from reality. This talk presents concrete evidence from two systematic studies of verified cryptographic libraries including post-quantum cryptographic libraries, extending to structural observations across the broader high-assurance ecosystem, to argue that demystifying formal verification is a prerequisite for making it actually work.
Coffee break
Chair: Gabriel Gallin
From new post-quantum signature schemes to their concrete implementations and evaluations, including the NYMPHEAS project.
Integration issues of post-quantum algorithms in communication protocols
Thomas Pornin, NCC Group
Post-quantum key exchange and signature schemes are meant to replace pre-quantum schemes such as RSA and ECDSA in existing communication protocols and data formats. However, they have somewhat different characteristics, in terms of size (larger keys, ciphertexts and signatures), speed, RAM usage, code size, protection from side-channel attacks, and API requirements such as data streaming and multi-signatures. In this talk, we discuss these issues especially in the case of the Falcon (FN-DSA) and Dilithium (ML-DSA) signature schemes, both for large systems (laptops, servers) and small embedded systems (microcontrollers). We will also investigate how implementers in the industry are starting to tackle these issues.
Presentation of the NYMPHEAS upstream study
Speaker to be confirmed, Secure-IC
Abstract to be announced.
Evaluation of NYMPHEAS signature scheme implementations
Speaker to be confirmed, SERMA
Abstract to be announced.
Chair: Karine Chatel
PhD students and early-career researchers present their ongoing work in informal discussions around their posters.
Opening and poster introductions by the presenters
Discussions around the posters
Coffee break
Chair: Antonin Leroux
A practical guide to planning and carrying out the transition of existing systems to post-quantum cryptography.
Practical Experiences in PQC Migration
Thomas Attema, TNO / CWI
As awareness of the quantum threat to cryptography continues to grow, many organizations are seeking practical guidance on how to begin their migration to post-quantum cryptography (PQC). In our PQC working group, seven organizations from different sectors collaborate to gain hands-on experience and learn from one another's challenges and successes.
In this talk, we share the lessons learned from a series of real-world experiments and proof-of-concepts aimed at understanding the cryptographic landscape organizations. We discuss different approaches to building a cryptographic inventory, including engaging with vendors, leveraging certificate issuance logs, and evaluating the effectiveness of existing scanning tools.
Beyond the technical aspects, we reflect on the trade-offs between the effort required and the value gained from different inventory objectives, such as identifying vulnerable cryptography, assessing migration risks, and prioritizing remediation activities. Finally, we discuss the benefits of tackling these challenges collaboratively. While reinventing the wheel can be wasteful, practical experimentation remains essential and sharing those experiences can accelerate PQC migration for everyone.
Best poster award
Lunch
Chair: Aurore Guillevic
Deploying PQC in constrained and hostile environments — smart cards, embedded devices, and code exposed to reverse engineering.
Securing Tomorrow with Post-Quantum Cryptography
Melissa Azouaoui, NXP
Quantum computing is becoming an engineering reality that must be considered in today's embedded system designs. As governments and standardization bodies define post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration roadmaps, manufacturers face the challenge of securing devices that may remain deployed for decades.
This talk explores the integration of PQC into embedded security architectures and the practical challenges of deploying quantum-safe security in resource-constrained environments. Drawing on NXP's experience in PQC standardization and product development, it highlights how PQC can be incorporated as a foundational security capability and what organizations can do today to prepare for the post-quantum transition.
Protecting Post-Quantum Cryptography in Hostile Environments (white-box)
Agathe Houzelot, IDEMIA
Post-quantum cryptography is progressively being integrated into consumer devices, mobile applications and digital identity infrastructures. However, this transition raises a new security challenge: how can quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms remain protected when deployed in hostile software environments that attackers can inspect, modify and reverse engineer?
White-box cryptography aims to protect cryptographic secrets even when an attacker has full visibility and control over the software implementation, but its application to post-quantum cryptography remains largely unexplored. In this talk, we investigate white-box implementations of post-quantum cryptography, using the FrodoKEM key encapsulation mechanism as a case study.
We explore how existing protection techniques can be adapted to a lattice-based cryptosystem, introduce new mechanisms when existing approaches are not applicable or insufficient, and evaluate the resulting trade-offs between security and performance. Our work highlights that the transition to post-quantum cryptography is not simply a matter of replacing classical algorithms. It also requires rethinking how cryptographic secrets are protected once deployed in software.
By addressing this challenge, we open a new research direction at the intersection of post-quantum cryptography and software protection techniques, contributing to the development of the next generation of secure digital services for the post-quantum era.
PQ cryptography on Smart-Card
R. Bendila and G. Zaid, Cryptoexpert
Abstract to be announced.
Coffee break
Chair: Philippe Chartier
Beyond encryption and signatures: key-exchange and messaging protocols, homomorphic encryption, and privacy-preserving signatures.
Triple Ratchet: a bandwidth-efficient hybrid secure Signal protocol
Thomas Prest, PQShield
Secure messaging apps are used by billions of people daily. Faced with the imminent threat of “Harvest Now, Decrypt Later” attacks, their providers must act now to make their protocols hybrid-secure: at least as secure as before, but now also post-quantum secure. Since most of these apps build on Signal's Double Ratchet, securing Signal matters a great deal.
Signal and Apple have already deployed hybrid variants: PQXDH on the initial handshake, and PQ3 on the whole protocol, by adding a PQ-ratchet. But the communication overhead of Kyber forces real-world PQ3 to run that ratchet only about every 50 messages, and this amortization degrades quickly in realistic scenarios, causing many consecutive retransmissions of 2272 bytes of public key and ciphertext.
We present Triple Ratchet, which improves on PQ3 in two ways. Erasure codes make communication inside the PQ-ratchet provably balanced, giving far better worst-case guarantees. And Katana, a new Kyber variant, cuts the combined ciphertext and public key size by over 37% at the 192-bit security level, from 2272 to 1416 bytes; along the way we identify and fix a security flaw in earlier optimization proposals.
Developed with the Signal team, who have brought some of these ideas into production. This talk is aimed at security practitioners rather than cryptographers alone.
The Zama Protocol in a Post-Quantum World
Morten Dahl, Zama
Blockchains are cryptographic systems in an unusually pure form: there are no trusted servers, account ownership rests entirely on digital signatures, and every transaction is published to a permanent, globally replicated ledger. This makes them uniquely exposed on both sides of the quantum threat: harvest-now-decrypt-later applies to a public ledger by construction, and a signature forgery is not fraud to be reversed but ownership itself.
The Zama Protocol adds confidentiality to blockchains using fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE): smart contracts operate on encrypted values, with decryption controlled by a threshold key management system built on secure multiparty computation. In this talk we give a component-by-component assessment of what the quantum threat means for this protocol, organized by a simple deadline distinction: confidentiality must be post-quantum today, while integrity must migrate before Q-day. The confidential layer, built on lattice assumptions from the same family as ML-KEM and ML-DSA, is already post-quantum; the threshold KMS is secure on paper but its deployment relies on classical primitives; the underlying blockchain's signatures remain classical. We present our phased roadmap for closing the gaps on our side, and along the way illustrate how the protocol works and the use cases being built on top of it.
DAKE: Bandwidth-Efficient AKE from Double-KEM
Éric Sageloli, Thales
Bandwidth remains a major bottleneck in post-quantum cryptography, especially for authenticated key exchange protocols, which are at the core of numerous applications.
In this presentation, we introduce DAKE (Double AKE), a generic family of secure and bandwidth-efficient AKE protocols contributing to this line of research. To improve the communication size of ML-KEM-based AKEs, these protocols rely on double-KEMs: primitives that encapsulate a single shared key under two public keys at once. We also introduce Maul, a size-efficient ML-KEM-inspired double-KEM designed to be compatible with our protocols.
When instantiated with Maul, our protocols reduce overall communication by about 16% in the mutually authenticated setting, and about 20% in the unilateral setting, improving over both the double-KEM AKE of Xue et al. (ASIACRYPT 2018) and standard ML-KEM-based AKEs.
Lattice EPID with Efficient Revocation
Olivier Sanders, Orange Labs
Abstract to be announced.
Provisional programme — talks and speakers marked "to be confirmed" will be announced later, and timings may still change.
A Call for Posters is open to PhD students and postdoctoral researchers. The poster session is an opportunity to present ongoing work and to engage in discussion with specialists from a range of disciplines. Topics may include, but are not limited to:
Each accepted poster will be the subject of a short 3-minute talk. The best poster will be awarded a prize during the event.
One-page abstract in English, with name, affiliation and contact details
11 October 2026
18 October 2026
Relevance, scientific quality and clarity
A0, portrait, written in English
Can be handled by the organizers (send your file ahead of time)
Early-career researchers are warmly encouraged to submit a proposal. Feel free also to forward this call to anyone who might be interested.
The Post-Quantum Cryptography workshop is featured on the program of the European Cyber Week 2026.
With the support of